The broad focus of the dissertation is mankind's problem of soul. The narrow focus is the nature of philosophy. The narrow focus evaluates the nature of philosophy by showing how philosophy makes the claim to resolve mankind's problem of soul by allowing us to overcome our experience of separation while preserving our distinctness. ;The philosophical standpoint allows us to overcome our experience of separation while preserving our distinctness by providing us with a fulfilling relation to the sources of intelligibility that (...) assimilates the soul's relation to the sources of life and order. The model form of this fulfilling relation to intelligibility allows the soul a fulfilling relation to what are truly the sources of life and order without the vulgar madness, the loss of distinctness, that threatens the non-philosopher. Philosophy in its model form is a divine madness that is characterized by both this comprehensive claim of fulfillment and a means of self-control, or sophrosyne, which preserves the soul's distinctness in relation to the sources of the cosmos. The narrow focus of the dissertation takes its bearings from the Platonic account of the unity of divine madness and self-control in the Phaedrus; the broad focus is oriented towards the Greek polis in relation to which the philosopher's comprehensive standpoint is most clearly visible. ;The success of philosophical fulfillment is purchased at the price of suppressing what is distinct, but not separate from, the zenith of intelligibility. The consequence of such a cost is that the philosophical standpoint leaves us with an irreducible residue of resistance to our drive to overcome the resistance of a lack of manageability and "shareability" to our experience. The last chapter explores the nature of the actual telos of human fulfillment, or what it would mean to overcome the limitations of the philosophical standpoint through the process of deification. (shrink)

Responsive to the signs of the Latin American situation, liberation theology suggests new interpretations of the symbols of faith and calls for a radical transformation of man and society.

In this paper I argue that there are seven stages, or orientations, of thought about divine madness (initially understood by Plato as eros) with each stage offering claims, or critiques of claims, about its nature. Moreover, each orientation offers a claim, or a critique of a claim, about a relation to the Good that comes through divine madness. My account of the stages is greatly indebted to, but divergent from, the work of William Desmond. Hence, my thought is metaxological and (...) the discussion of the stages takes its bearings from the "between" of eros and agape. I make reference to Desmond's work in order to develop and contrast my own view of the Good as both agapeic and erotic. I argue that the agapeic activity of the Good has an erotic aspect. This aspect of the Good is not an incompleteness or need; rather, it is an absence that "contains" the Good's agapeic activity of creation. Further, this aspect serves not to realize the Good but to ground the becoming in creation (including the movement of our eros through the seven stages of divine madness). I develop how in the seventh stage our eros dynamically images the erotic aspect of the Good's activity by consciously intermediating its relations to the other. (shrink)